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Abstract
This paper provides an analysis of individual and social decision criteria for alternatives that are
composed of several attributes. We derive additive and multiplicative criteria for individual
decision-making with new axioms and apply these criteria to obtain new justiﬁcations of known
social choice rules with a bargaining interpretation, namely the generalized utilitarian and Nash
social choice functions. Unlike most axiomatizations of bargaining solutions, our approach is, to a
large extent, based on the multi-attribute structure of the underlying alternatives and the resulting
individual decision criteria instead of axioms that impose restrictions on the choice function
directly. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: D81; D71; C78
1. Introduction
A standard cooperative bargaining solution as introduced by Nash (1950) assigns a
utility vector to each pair of a utility possibilities set and a disagreement point (the utility
vector resulting if the agents fail to reach an agreement) within a given domain. For
example, a typical domain of a bargaining solution consists of all pairs such that the
disagreement point is normalized to be the origin and the utility possibilities set is
convex and compact. Comprehensiveness of the feasible set frequently is required as
well. In this paper, we consider an informationally richer framework by allowing for the
possibility that the structure of the set of objects over which the bargaining process takes
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place may matter. In particular, we examine multi-attribute bargaining problems.
Multiple-issue bargaining — as it is often called — is also discussed in Kalai (1977) in
the context of interpreting his step-by-step negotiation axiom; see Kalai (1977, p. 1627)
for details. Furthermore, Ponsati and Watson (1997) provide an analysis of multiple-
issue bargaining in a cooperative framework. A typical example for a concrete multi-
attribute bargaining problem is a wage-employment bargaining model such as the one
developed by McDonald and Solow (1981). Multiple-issue bargaining in a non-
cooperative setting is discussed, for example, in Busch and Horstmann (1997) and in
Fershtman (1990).
To begin with, we provide new axiomatic derivations of additive and multiplicative
multi-attribute criteria for an individual decision maker. The preferences of a decision
maker over combinations of attributes are additive if they can be represented by a
cardinal utility function that can be written as the sum of the utilities of the individual
attributes. The multiplicative decision criterion is based on the product of the utilities
over attributes. Clearly, these types of preferences possess separability properties with
respect to the attributes under consideration. See Fishburn (1970) for a comprehensive
treatment of utility theory and decision criteria.
Speciﬁcally, we use a weak version of utility independence (see, for instance, Keeney
and Raiffa, 1976, and the references quoted there) together with an additivity axiom to
generate an additive representation of an agent’s preferences. Similarly, we show that
the multiplicative decision criterion is implied by an analogous utility independence
axiom and a condition regarding the existence and properties of worst possible attributes.
By employing these new axioms, the paper also makes a contribution to the theory of
decision-making in the presence of several attributes. A discussion of separable
structures in consumer and producer theory can be found in Blackorby et al. (1978).
Turning from individual to social decision-making, we ﬁrst characterize efﬁciency in
both the additive and the multiplicative case. This efﬁciency criterion, which leads to the
standard weak Pareto optimality condition, together with some other assumptions, is
then used to derive social decision procedures with a bargaining interpretation. In the
additive case, weak Pareto optimality and an independence condition regarding the
restriction of choices to speciﬁc attributes lead to the generalized (not necessarily
symmetric) utilitarian social choice functions, provided a mild regularity condition is
satisﬁed. Analogously, in the multiplicative case, generalized Nash social choice
functions are obtained. The novel aspect of those axiomatic derivations of well-known
social choice functions is that much of the structure is imposed through the individual
preferences rather than through axioms that operate directly on the social choice function
itself. We therefore provide a decision-theoretic foundation of these commonly used
solutions.
2. Multi-attribute preferences
Let N denote the set of positive integers, and let R (R ) be the set of all (positive) 11
n real numbers. For n [N, R is the n-fold Cartesian product of R. Let M 5h1 ,...,mj be
a set of m [N attributes. The sets A ,...,A are the corresponding non-empty spaces 1 mW. Bossert, H. Peters / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 327–339 329
of these attributes. Let A53 A . For a [ A and M97M, let a be the subvector j[Mj 2M9
of a that contains the components in M\M9 only. If M9 is a singleton hjj, we use the
9 simpler notation a instead of a . Analogously, for A97 A and M97M, A 5 2j 2h jj 2M9
99 ha ua [ A9j, and if M9 is a singleton hjj, we write A instead of A . 2M9 2j 2h jj
We assume there is a decision maker who has a cardinal utility function u: A®R.W e
00 also assume that there is a ﬁxed m-tuple a [ A with u(a)$u(a ) for all a [ A. That is,
0 a is a worst alternative in A.
9 Let j [M. By ﬁxing the m 21 attributes in M\hjj at some given levels a [ A , the 2j 2j
utility function u induces a utility function u : A ®R on the attribute space A . The jj j
property of utility independence (see Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, in particular Chaps. 5
and 6) requires that this induced utility function is independent of the speciﬁc levels of
the other attributes — as is already suggested by its notation. To deﬁne this property
99 formally, let 5± A97 A, and let j [M. A is utility independent of A if for every j 2j
99 9 9 a [ A there exist functions f : A ®R and g : A ®R such that 2j 2jj 2jj 2j 11
9 u(a)5f (a )1g (a )u(a , a ), for all a [ A9 (1) j 2jj 2jj 2j
Clearly, utility independence is a separability property. (1) means that, on the restricted
domain A9, values of attribute j can be assessed without knowledge of speciﬁc values of
the remaining attributes. See Keeney and Raiffa (1976) for a detailed discussion of this
and related separability assumptions in this framework.
3. Additive decision criteria
In this section, we show that a speciﬁc utility independence requirement and a weak
additivity assumption imply that u must be additive.
0 Restricted a utility independence requires that we can ﬁnd a chain of m 21 attributes
such that, for each attribute j in this chain, A is utility independent of all other j
0 attributes, where this independence can be restricted to attribute values of a for all k
attributes k that appear before j in the chain. For simplicity of exposition, we formulate
this condition for the chain consisting of the ﬁrst m 21 attributes and leave the obvious
generalization to the reader.
0 Restricted a utility independence:
· A is utility independent of A ; 1 21
0 · A is utility independent of ha j3A ; 21 2h1,2j
· :
00 0 · A is utility independent of ha j3ha j3???3ha j3 A . m211 2 m22 m
This independence axiom is considerably weaker than Keeney and Raiffa’s (1976)
mutual utility independence because, for each j [M\h1, mj, all attributes k ,j in the
0 chain can be ﬁxed at a . Moreover, only m 21 rather than all m attributes are required k
to satisfy an independence condition.330 W. Bossert, H. Peters / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 327–339
The second axiom is a weakening of additive independence (see Keeney and Raiffa,
1976). Again, we state this condition for a chain involving the ﬁrst m 21 attributes only
in order to simplify notation.
Restricted additive independence:
0 99 9 9 9 9 9 · For all a [ A , there exist a , a [ A such that u(a , a )1u(a , a )5u(a , 21 211 1 11 211 211
00 0 99 9 99 a )1u(a , a ) and u(a , a )±u(a , a ); 211 211 211 21
0 99 9 9 · and, for all a [ A , there exist a , a [ A such that u(a , a , a )1 2h1,2j 2h1,2j 22 2 122h1,2j
00 0 0 0 99 9 99 9 99 u(a , a )5u(a , a )1u(a , a , a ) and u(a , a )±u(a , a ); 2 222 221 2 2h1,2j 2 222 22
· :
00 99 9 9 · and, for all a [ A , there exist a , a [ A such that u(a ,...,a , a , mm m 21 m21 m211 m22 m21
00 0 0 99 9 99 9 a )1u(a , a )5u(a , a )1u(a ,...,a , a , a ) and u(a , mm 21 2(m21) m21 2(m21) 1 m22 m21 mm 21
00 99 a )±u(a , a ). 2(m21) m21 2(m21)
0 Analogously to restricted a utility independence, the requirements imposed by restricted
additive independence become successively weaker as we progress along the chain of
attributes. Restricted additive independence is analogous in spirit to Keeney and Raiffa’s
(1976) additive independence (formulated for two attributes only). Additive indepen-
99 9 99 9 dence requires that there exist some attribute values a , a [ A and a , a [ A such 11 1 22 2
99 9 99 9 99 9 9 99 99 99 9 9 that u(a , a )1u(a , a )5u(a , a )1u(a , a ) and u(a , a )±u(a , a ,) and u(a , 12 1 2 12 1 2 12 12 1
99 9 9 a )±u(a , a ). Our version of the additive independence condition, in contrast, requires 21 2
the existence of speciﬁc attribute values for several values of the other attributes, and the
0 worst attribute combination a must be involved. This is the case because we combine
0 the axiom with a rather weak form of utility independence — namely restricted a utility
independence — whereas Keeney and Raiffa (1976) employ the much stronger mutual
utility independence. Furthermore, note that restricted additive independence only
requires two of the utility values involved to be distinct, but additive independence
demands two inequalities of that kind.
The following theorem derives the additive decision criterion from the above axioms.
That is, we show that, if combined, the two conditions generate a strong separability
property — namely additive separability. See, for example, Blackorby et al. (1978) for a
thorough discussion of various separability properties. Note that, in order to reformulate
the axioms for general chains in this theorem, the same chains have to be used in both
00 axioms. Recall that a is a worst alternative, i.e. u(a)$u(a ) for all a [ A.
0 Theorem 1. Let u satisfy restricted a utility independence and restricted additive
0 independence. Assume u is normalized so that u(a )50. Then u(a)5o u(a , a ) for 0 j[Mj 2j
all a [ A.
Proof. Because A is utility independent of A , there exist functions f and g such 1 211 1
that:
0 u(a)5f (a )1g (a )u(a , a ), for all a [ A (2) 1 211 211 21W. Bossert, H. Peters / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 327–339 331
00 0 9 where we chose a 5a in (1). Letting a 5a in (2), we obtain f (a )5u(a , a ) 21 211 1 1 211 21
0 for all a [ A because u(a )50. Therefore:
00 u(a)5u(a , a )1g (a )u(a , a ), for all a [ A (3) 1 211 211 21
Because, by restricted additive independence, there exists a [ A such that u(a , 11 1
00 0 0 a )±0, we can choose a 5a in (3) and use u(a )50 to obtain g (a )51. 21 21 211 21
Using restricted additive independence and (3), it follows that, for all a [ A , 21 21
99 9 there exist a , a [ A such that: 11 1
00 0 00 99 9 99 9 g (a )[u(a , a )2u(a , a )]5g (a )[ u(a , a )2u(a , a )] 1 211 211 211 211 211 21
00 99 9 Because, by restricted additive independence, u(a , a )±u(a , a ), this implies: 1 211 21
0 g (a )5g (a )51 for all a [ A. Therefore: 1 211 21
00 u(a)5u(a , a )1u(a , a ), for all a [ A (4) 1 211 21
0 Because A is utility independent of ha j3 A , there exist functions f and g 21 2h1,2j 22
0 9 such that, with a 5a in (1): 22
00 0 0 u(a , a )5f (a , a )1g (a , a )u(a , a ), for all a [ A (5) 1 212 1 2h1,2j 21 2h1,2j 2 22
00 0 0 0 Letting a 5a in (5) and using u(a )50, we obtain f (a , a )5u(a , a , a ) 22 2 1 2h1,2j 122h1,2j
for all a [ A. Therefore:
00 0 0 0 u(a , a )5u(a , a , a )1g (a , a )u(a , a ), for all a [ A (6) 1 211 2 2h1,2j 21 2h1,2j 2 22
0 By restricted additive independence, there exists a [ A such that u(a , a )±0. 22 2 22
00 Therefore, letting a 5a in (6) implies g (a )51. 2h1,2j 2h1,2j 2 22
9 By restricted additive independence and (6), for all a [ A , there exist a , 2h1,2j 2h1,2j 2
99 a [ A such that: 21
00 0 0 0 0 99 9 99 9 g (a , a )[u(a , a )2u(a , a )]5g (a )[u(a , a )2u(a , a )] 21 2h1,2j 2 222 222 222 222 22
00 0 99 9 By restricted additive independence, u(a , a )±u(a , a ) and, hence, g (a , 2 222 222 1
0 a )5g (a )51 for all a [ A. Therefore: 2h1,2j 2 22
00 0 0 u(a , a )5u(a , a , a )1u(a , a ), for all a [ A (7) 1 211 2 2h1,2j 2 22
Using (7) in (4), we obtain:
00 0 0 u(a)5u(a , a , a )1u(a , a )1u(a , a ), for all a [ A 122h1,2j 2 221 21
Repeated application of this argument for the attributes 3,...,m 21 yields:
00 0 u(a)5u(a , a )1???1u(a , a )1u(a , a ) for all a [ A. h m 2m 2 221 21
An immediate consequence of Theorem 1 is that u can be written as:
u(a)5O u (a ), for all a [ A (8) jj
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where for every j [M, u : A ®R is an induced utility function as introduced in Section jj
2.
4. Multiplicative decision criteria
Keeney and Raiffa (1976) prove that if each attribute space A is utility independent j
of A , then the cardinal utility function u can be written as a multilinear function — 2j
see Keeney and Raiffa (1976, Chaps. 5 and 6) for details. In this section, we derive the
special case of a multiplicative decision criterion with a weaker utility independence
0 axiom and an assumption which requires the a to lead to a worst alternative even when j
0 combined with some values of a other than a . 2j 2j
0 To exclude degenerate cases, we assume that there is an a*[ A with a*±a for all jj
0 0 ¯ j [M and u(a*).u(a ). For j [M, deﬁne A [ha [ A ua ±a for all 2h1 ,...,jj 2h1 ,...,jj kk
k 5j 11 ,..., mj. The utility independence condition is parallel to the one in the
0 ¯ previous section, where a is replaced with a*, and A by A . 2h1 ,...,jj 2h1 ,...,jj
Restricted a* utility independence:
¯ · A is utility independent of A ; 1 21
¯ · A is utility independent of ha*j3A ; 21 2h1,2j
· :
¯ · A is utility independent of ha*j3ha*j3???3ha* j3A . m211 2 m22 2h1 ,..., m21j
0 The following axiom requires a to lead to a worst alternative when combined with j
certain values of a . 2j
Restricted zero independence:
0 u(a9)$u(a , a ), for all a, a9[ A (9) 1 21
0 u(a9)$u(a*, a , a ), for all a, a9[ A (10) 122h1,2j
:
0 u(a9)$u(a* ,...,a*, a , a ), for all a, a9[ A (11) 1 m22 m21 m
0 Restricted zero independence implies that a is a worst-possible value for attribute one 1
0 0 in an absolute sense: a leads to a worst alternative not only combined with a but 1 21
combined with any value of a . The remaining restrictions imposed by the axiom are 21
weaker because they apply only to some but not to all values of the remaining attributes.
Requiring restricted zero independence is close to but weaker than imposing the
so-called zero condition on attributes 1,..., m 21, as is done in Miyamoto et al.
0 (1998). The zero condition holds for attribute j if the level a for attribute j makes the j
decision maker indifferent between all combinations of the other attributes.W. Bossert, H. Peters / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 327–339 333
The above two axioms lead to the multiplicative decision criterion described in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let u satisfy restricted a* utility independence and restricted zero
0 independence. Assume that u is normalized so that u(a )50 and u(a*)51. Then:
* u(a)5P u(a , a ) for all a [ A. j 2j
j[M
Proof. By (9–11) we must have:
0 u(a , a )50, for all a [ A (12) 1 21
0 u(a*, a , a )50, for all a [ A (13) 122h1,2j
:
0 u(a* ,...,a*, a , a )50, for all a [ A (14) 1 m22 m21 m
¯ 9 Because A is utility independent of A , choosing a 5a* in (1) implies that 1 21 21 21
there exist functions f and g such that: 11
u(a)5f (a )1g (a )u(a , a* ), for all a [ A (15) 1 211 211 21
0 Letting a 5a in (15), (12) implies f (a )50 for all a [ A. 11 1 21
Now let a 5a* in (15). Noting that f (a )50 and u(a*)51, it follows that 11 1 21
g (a )5u(a*, a ) for all a [ A. Therefore: 1 211 21
u(a)5u(a*, a )u(a , a* ), for all a [ A (16) 1 211 21
¯ Because A is utility independent of ha*j3A , there exist functions f and g 21 2h1,2j 22
such that:
u(a*, a )5f (a*, a )1g (a*, a )u(a , a* ), for all a [ A (17) 1 212 1 2h1,2j 212h1,2j 2 22
0 9 [choose a 5a* in (1)]. Letting a 5a in (17) and using (13), we obtain f (a*, 22 222 2 2 1
a )50 for all a [ A. Now let a 5a* in (17) to obtain g (a*, a )5u(a*, a*, 2h1,2j 22 2 1 2h1,2j 12
a ) for all a [ A. Hence: 2h1,2j
u(a*, a )5u(a*, a*, a )u(a , a*), for all a [ A (18) 1 211 2 2h1,2j 22
Using (18) in (16), we obtain:
** * * u(a)5u(a , a , a )u(a , a )u(a , a ), for all a [ A 122h1,2j 2 221 21
Repeated application of this argument for the attributes 3,...,m 21 yields:
** * u(a)5u(a , a )...u(a , a )u(a , a ) for all a [ A. h m 2m 2 221 21
Again, it follows that there exist induced cardinal utility functions u : A ®R for all jj
j [M such that:334 W. Bossert, H. Peters / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 327–339
u(a)5P u (a ), for all a [ A (19) jj
j[M
To conclude this section we note that the conditions in Theorem 2 are sufﬁcient but
not necessary for a multiplicative representation. For example, take m 52, A 5 A 5 12
h1/2, 1j, and u(a , a )5aa. In this case, (9) is not satisﬁed. 12 1 2
5. Efﬁciency
Consider now a situation where we have n [N decision makers concerned with the
multi-attribute alternatives in A. Let N 5h1 ,...,nj denote the set of decision makers.
i We use u : A®R to denote the cardinal utility function of individual i [N. The induced
i utility functions (as in Theorems 1 and 2) on A are denoted by u : A ®R for all j [M jj j
0ii 0 and all i [N. For each agent i [N, a and a* are the alternatives corresponding to a
and a* in the single-agent case. Note that these alternatives may be agent-speciﬁc.
We make the assumption that the set of utility vectors corresponding to outcomes in
1 nn A, i.e. the set h(u (a) ,...,u (a)) [R ua [ Aj, is a convex set. In this framework, it is of
interest to identify those outcomes that are efﬁcient in the sense that it is impossible to
ˆ make everyone in N better off. Formally, an outcome a [ A is efﬁcient if and only if, for
ii ˆ all a [ A, there exists i [N such that u (a)$u (a). Hence, efﬁciency here corresponds
to the concept of weak Pareto optimality — see Section 6.
The set of efﬁcient outcomes can be characterized in the additive and multiplicative
cases discussed in the previous sections. If all agents’ preferences have an additive
nn representation, we obtain the following result. Let D denote the unit simplex in R .
i 0i Theorem 3. Let each u satisfy restricted a utility independence and restricted additive
i 0i ˆ independence, and assume u (a )50 for every i [N. Then an outcome a [ Ai s
1 nn ˆ efﬁcient if and only if there exists t 5(t ,..., t )[D such that a maximizes oi[N
ii ii ˆ tu(a) on A and, for all j [M, a maximizes o tu(a ) on A . ji [Nj j j
Proof. Because the set of utility vectors generated by the outcomes in A is convex,
ni i ˆˆ a [ A is efﬁcient if and only if there exists t [D such that a maximizes o tu(a)o n i[N
A.
ii n ˆ Suppose a [ A maximizes o tu(a)o nA for some t [D .B y( 8 ) : i[N
ii u (a)5O u (a ), for all i [N, for all a [ A jj
j[M
Because:
ii i i max O t O u (a ) 5O max O tu(a ) (20) jj jj HJ HJ
i[Nj [Mj [Mi [N
ii ˆ a maximizes o tu(a ) for all j [M ji [Nj j
ii ˆ Conversely, suppose a maximizes o tu(a ) for all j [M. Using (20), it follows ji [Nj j
ii ˆ that a maximizes o tu(a)o nA. h i[NW. Bossert, H. Peters / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 327–339 335
In the multiplicative case, we obtain an analogous result. As in Theorem 2, we now
0ii assume the existence of appropriate a and a* for each i [N.
ii Theorem 4. Let each u satisfy restricted a* utility independence and restricted zero
i 0ii i independence, and assume u (a )50 and u (a*)51 for each i [N. Then an outcome
1 nn ˆˆ a [ A is efﬁcient if and only if there exists t 5(t ,...,t )[D such that a maximizes
i i it i t ˆ P u (a) on A and, for all j [M, a maximizesP u (a ) on A . i[Nj i [Njj j
Proof. Again, the convexity of the set of utility vectors generated by the outcomes in A
n ˆˆ implies that an outcome a [ A is efﬁcient if and only if there exists t [D such that a
i it 0 maximizesP u (a)o n A, where we use the convention 0 [1. i[N i it n ˆ Suppose a maximizesP u (a)o n A for some t [D .B y( 1 9 ) : i[N
ii u (a)5P u (a ), for all i [N, for all a [ A jj
j [M
ˆ and, therefore, a maximizes:
i it PPu (a ) jj
i[Nj[M
k kt ˆ on A. Suppose ﬁrst that there exists k [N such that u (a) 50, in which casePi[N i it k k ˆ u (a) 50. Note that this can occur only if t .0 and u (a)50. By assumption,
ii u (a*)51.0 for all i [N. By restricted zero independence and the assumption that
the set of utility vectors generated is a convex set, there must be an a*[ A such that
i ii t ˆ u (a*).0 for all i [N and thusP u (a*) .0, contradicting the observation that a i[N i i it it ˆ maximizesP u (a) . Therefore, this case cannot occur, and we must have u (a) .0 i[N
for all i [N. Hence:
ii it it max PPu (a ) 5P max P u (a ) (21) HJ H jjJ jj
i[Nj [Mj [Mi [N
i it ˆ and, as in Theorem 3, it follows immediately that a maximizesP u (a )o n A for ji [Njj j
all j [M.
i it ii ˆ Now suppose a maximizesP u (a )o n A for all j [M. Because u (a*).0 for ji [Njj j
ii * all i [N, u (a ).0 for all i [N and for all j [M. As before there are a* [ A with jj jj i i it u (a*).0 for all i [N and for all j [M and, thus,P u (a*) .0 for all j [M. jj i[Nj j ii it it ˆˆ Therefore, in order for a to maximizeP u (a ) , it must be the case that u (a ) .0 ji [Njj jji it ˆ for all i [N and for all j [M. By (21), it follows that a maximizesP u (a)o n i[N
A. h
6. Multi-attribute bargaining problems
The results of the previous sections can be illustrated by applying the additive and
multiplicative criteria to speciﬁc group decision problems. For example, consider the
problem of selecting outcomes from a feasible set of alternatives on the basis of the
agents’ preferences. Suppose the space of alternatives A is given, and we want to make a336 W. Bossert, H. Peters / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 327–339
selection from A for all proﬁles of individual utility functions within a given class.
Because A is ﬁxed throughout this section, we simplify notation by suppressing the
dependence of the functions considered here on A. A proﬁle of cardinal utility functions
1 n is denoted by U 5(u ,...,u ). The utility possibilities set generated by the proﬁle U is
given by:
ni i hx [R u'a [ A such that x 5u (a), for all i [Nj
Accordingly, the induced utility possibilities set for attribute j [M is:
ni i hx [R u'a [ A such that x 5u (a ), for all i [Nj jj j j
1 n Let 8 be a set of admissible proﬁles U 5(u ,...,u ) of cardinal utility functions. Let
A 2 be the set of all non-empty subsets of A. A social choice function is a mapping c:
A ii 8 ®2 such that, for all U [8 and for all a, a9[c(U), u (a)5u (a9) for all i [N.
That is, we make the assumption commonly used in cooperative models of bargaining
that there is a unique utility vector associated with the selected outcomes. Interpreted as
10 1 n 0n a bargaining problem, the disagreement point is given by (u (a ) ,..., u (a )) 5
0i (0 ,..., 0) ; recall that a denotes the worst alternative for agent i [N. A bargaining
solution is a special case of a social choice function, where the only relevant features are
the utility possibilities set and the disagreement point of a problem. Since this additional
restriction is not necessary for the purposes of this section, we will use the more general
choice function c as deﬁned above.
Aj The social choice function c induces a choice function c : 8 ®2 for each attribute j
j [M. Speciﬁcally, for all j [M and all U [8, c (U)5ha [ A ua [c(U)j. Note that jj j
we do not explicitly require that the same utility vector results for all chosen outcomes
in the image of the induced choice functions — this property follows as a consequence
of our choice independence axiom deﬁned below.
Using the results of the previous sections, we can derive generalized utilitarian and
generalized Nash social choice functions in this framework. In addition to the axioms on
individual preferences leading to the additive and multiplicative representations derived
above, we impose some restrictions on the choice function c.
First, we require c to be weakly Pareto optimal in the sense that it selects efﬁcient
outcomes only. Let E(U) denote the set of efﬁcient outcomes A for the proﬁle U [8.
Weak Pareto optimality: For all U [8, c(U)7E(U).
Furthermore, we impose an independence condition regarding the choice of the
individual attributes.
ii ˆ ˆ Choice independence: For all j [M, for all U, U [8,i fu 5u for all i [N, then jj
ii ˆ ˆˆ u (a )5u (a ) for all a [c (U) and for all a [c (U). j j j j jj jj
Choice independence requires that the selection of each attribute is independent of the
values of the remaining attributes and, thus, is another separability condition. Note that
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corresponding induced social choice function lead to the same utility vector (to see this,
ˆ set U 5U in the deﬁnition of choice independence).
Finally, we impose a regularity condition.
¯ Regularity: There exist U [8 and h, k [M such that h ±k and, for all j [hh, kj, there
exists a unique tangent hyperplane to the induced utility possibilities set for attribute j at
1 n ¯ ¯¯ ¯¯ ¯ the point (u (a ) ,...,u (a )), where a [c (U). jj jj j j
Regularity only requires the existence of some proﬁle such that the tangent hyperplane to
two induced utility possibilities at the utility vectors induced by the choice function is
unique. Note that any bargaining solution deﬁned on a standard domain satisﬁes a
regularity condition of that type.
n We call c a generalized utilitarian social choice function if there exists t [D such
ii that, for all U [8, c(U) is a subset of the set of maximizers of o tu(a)o nA. i[N
n Analogously, c is a generalized Nash social choice function if there exists t [D such
i it that, for all U [8, c(U) is a subset of the set of maximizers ofP u (a)o n A. i[N
Theorem 5. Let 8 be the set of all proﬁles U such that the utility possibilities set
0i associated with U is compact and convex and, for each i [N, there exists a [ A such
ii 0ii 0i that u (a)$u (a )50 for all a [ A, and u satisﬁes restricted a utility independence
and restricted additive independence. Let c be a social choice function satisfying weak
Pareto optimality, choice independence, and regularity. Then c is a generalized
utilitarian social choice function.
¯ Proof. Let U [8 and h, k [M be as in the deﬁnition of the regularity axiom. By weak
n ¯ Pareto optimality and the deﬁnition of c, there exists t [D such that a is a maximizer
ii ii ¯ ¯¯ ¯ ¯ of o tu(a)o nA for all a [c(U). By Theorem 3, a maximizes o tu(a )o nA i[Nj i [Nj j j
for all j [M. Regularity implies that, for j [hh, kj, t is the only vector of coefﬁcients for
¯ which a maximizes this weighted sum on A . jj
ii i i ˆ ˆ¯ ˆ Let U [8 be arbitrary. Let the proﬁle U be such that u 5u and u 5u for all hh jj
ˆ ˆˆ i [N and for all j [M\hhj. Let a [c(U). By weak Pareto optimality, a maximizes oi[N
ii n ii ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ tu(a)o nA for some t [D . Theorem 3 implies that a maximizes o tu(a )o nA ji [Nj j j
ii ˆ ˆˆ ˆ¯ for all j [M. Choice independence implies that u (a )5u (a ). By regularity, t 5t. hh hh
ii i i ˜ ˜ ¯ˆ Now let the proﬁle U be such that u 5u and u 5u for all i [N and for all kk jj
ii ˜ ˜ ˜˜ ˜ j [M\hkj. Let a [c(U). By weak Pareto optimality, a maximizes o tu(a)o nA for i[N
n ii ˜˜ ˜˜ some t [D . Again, Theorem 3 implies that a maximizes o tu(a )o nA for all ji [Nj j j
ii ˜ ˜˜ ˜¯ j [M. Choice independence implies that u (a )5u (a ). By regularity, t 5t. kk kk
ii ˆ Let a [c(U). By choice independence, for all i [N, u (a )5u (a ) for all j [M\hhj jj jj
ii i i ˜ and u (a )5u (a ). This implies that a maximizes o tu(a )o nA for all j [M hh hh j i [Nj j j
and, using the argument in the proof of Theorem 3, it follows that a maximizes oi[N
ii tu(a)o nA. h
Analogously, the generalized Nash social choice functions are implied in the
multiplicative case. Because the proof of this result is parallel to the proof of the
previous theorem, it is omitted.338 W. Bossert, H. Peters / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 327–339
Theorem 6. Let 8 be the set of all proﬁles U such that the utility possibilities set
0ii associated with U is compact and convex and, for each i [N, there exist a , a* [ A
ii 0ii i i i such that u (a)$u (a )50 for all a [ A and u (a*)51, and u satisﬁes restricted a*
utility independence and restricted zero independence. Let c be a social choice function
satisfying weak Pareto optimality, choice independence, and regularity. Then c is a
generalized Nash social choice function.
An interesting feature of Theorems 5 and 6 is that the resulting social choice functions
are such that the attributes can be separated in a bargaining process: it is sufﬁcient to
consider each attribute independently of the remaining ones. This considerably facilitates
the application of the procedure to actual bargaining situations.
As an illustration, suppose the allocation of m goods in an n-agent economy is to be
determined by means of a bargaining process. If the individual preferences satisfy the
appropriate independence axioms, the results of this section can be used to justify the
use of a generalized utilitarian solution or a generalized Nash solution. By adding a
symmetry or anonymity condition, the utilitarian solution and the Nash solution are
obtained. See also Kalai (1977) and Ponsati and Watson (1997) for examples and
discussions of multiple-issue bargaining situations.
7. Concluding remarks
The results of this paper provide a decision-theoretic foundation for speciﬁc social
choice procedures. In particular, multi-attribute decision criteria are employed. An
assumption underlying our approach is that individual utility functions are of the same
structure. One possibility for extending our work would be to examine situations where
individual agents may have different types of utility functions over multi-attribute
alternatives.
All our results have been formulated and derived for the case of cardinal utility. To a
large extent they can almost without modiﬁcation be stated and derived for the
framework of decision making under risk, where lotteries are included and utility is of
the von Neumann–Morgenstern type (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). In
bargaining this is a quite standard framework and, indeed, it would imply the convexity
assumption made in Sections 5 and 6. Theorems 4 and 6 on the multiplicative case,
however, would have to be modiﬁed, e.g. by requiring that efﬁcient outcomes are always
riskless.
Finally, we note that the results for the multiplicative case (the even-numbered
theorems) are derived independently of the results for additive structures (the odd-
numbered theorems). In contrast, Trockel (1998) derives the Nash bargaining solution by
means of an exponential transformation from an additive setup. In order to employ an
analogous procedure for the results obtained here, it would be required to formulate the
axioms for the multiplicative case by using a structure that exactly parallels that of the
additive model.W. Bossert, H. Peters / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 327–339 339
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